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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7574 
ROBERT C. LAWRENCE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment of 
conviction of grand larceny for theft of an automobile. The 
only testimony in the record to support value of the property 
stolen was that of the owner of the vehicle, lvfr. Stanley LeRoy 
Allen, Jr., to the effect that the automobile was a model 1947 
Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition. 
At the closing of the case and before instructions to the 
jury, counsel for the defendant moved for a directed verdict 
on the grounds that there was no evidence as to the value of 
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the automobile taken (R. 106). This motion was denied and 
in instruction No. 8 the court stated in part: 
" * * * In this case you will take the value of this 
property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore 
the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand 
larceny (R. 108). 
Under the issues raised by defendant on appeal, these are 
the only material facts: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT REASONABLE 
MINDS CANNOT DIFFER ON THE QUESTION 
WHETHER A MODEL 1947 FORD TWO-DOOR SEDAN 
IN EXCELLENT CONDITION EXCEEDS $50.00 IN 
VALUE, THERE IS NO ERROR IN INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT, BY TAKING THIS APPEAL, HAS 
WAIVED THE PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY IN THE 
EVENT OF REVERSAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
INSTRUCTION .NO. 8 WAS NOT ERROR BECAUSE 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER ON THE 
PROPOSITION THAT A MODEL 1947 FORD TWO-DOOR 
4 
I. 
I 
I. 
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SEDAN IN EXCELLENT CONDITION EXCEEDS $50.00 
IN VALUE. 
We concede that, where there is no evidence at all upon 
which value of property stolen may be based, a conviction of 
grand larcency under Section 103-36-4 ( 1), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, cannot stand. However, the record of this case 
shows that the property taken was a model 1947 Ford two-
door sedan in excellent condition. Defendant on this appeal 
does not put in issue the question whether he actually stole 
this property. He does not attack the conviction on the 
grounds that he did not commit an act of larceny. His position 
is merely that, because the prosecuting attorney did not place 
testimony in the record of the monetary value of the auto-
mobile stolen, this court should reverse and remand for dis-
missal or directions to enter a verdict of guilty of petit larceny. 
He apparently concedes that a model 1947 Ford two-door sedan 
in excellent condition has some value. 
We respectfully submit that as a matter of general knowl-
edge a model 1947 Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition 
is worth far in excess of $50.00 and that the minds of reason-
able men could not differ on this point. It would be absurd 
indeed to urge that the stealing of such a vehicle should be 
punished as petit larcency. In view of this, we respectfully 
submit that the court did not commit prejudicial error in giving 
instruction No. 8. 
We have been unable to find authority in point on this 
issue. However, cases cited by defendant involve property, 
the value of which is highly debatable, or property, the value 
of which may be so dose to the minimum amount for grand 
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larcency and about which reasonable men :might differ, such 
as to warrant reversal, or cases where there is no evidence on 
which value may be inferred. We believe the facts of this 
case are easily distinguishable from those of authorities cited. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT, BY TAKING THIS APPEAL, HAS 
WAIVED THE PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY IN THE 
EVENT OF REVERSAL. 
Defendant in his argument under Point three constructs 
an ingenious proposition to the effect that the defendant has 
been once in jeopardy by reason of the trial of this case, that 
the alleged error in failing to prove value of the property stolen 
justifies reversal, and in view of the fact that he has been 
once in jeopardy this court must either reverse and remand 
with directions to dismiss or reverse and remand with directions 
to enter a judgment of guilty of petit larceny. 
We believe thjs is a misapprehension of the law, and de-
fendant, by appealing from the verdict and judgment has 
waived' a plea of jeopardy. Defendant does not contend that 
the record shows no crime was committed; he does not assert 
that he could not be guilty of larceny in one degree or another. 
The record amply supports the, finding that he stole the auto-
mobile. If the failure of the prosecuting attorney to put in 
testimony as to the monetary value of the automobile be 
reversible error; then we maintain that defendant is at most 
entitled to a new trial. 
_In the case of People vs. Travers, 19 Pac. 268, 77 Cal. 
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176, defendant had been charged with an attempt to commit 
burglary, without specification of the degree. A verdict of 
"guilty as charged" was returned, and judgment entered, from 
which he appealed. The case was reversed and remanded 
for new trial. Defendant then filed a supplementary plea of 
once in jeopardy. The California Supreme Court held that 
such a plea did not lie, stating in part: 
"If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the 
cause, or if the indictment or information was so de-
fective that no valid judgment could be rendered upon 
it; or if, by any overruling necessity, the jury are dis-
charged without a verdict, or the ·jury are discharged 
with the consent of the defendant, either express or 
implied; or if, after verdict against the accused, it has 
been set aside on his motion for a new trial, or on 
writ of error, or in arrest of judgment,-in all these, 
and a few other cases which might be enumerated, the 
accused may again be put upon trial, and the proceed-
ings had will constitute no protection. * * * When 
the defendant appealed from the judgment, and pro-
cured a reversal, one of the effects of which was the 
ordering of a new trial, the judgment and verdict in 
such a case must be assumed to be set aside at the 
instance of the defendant, upon the theory that he who 
procures the reversal or affirmance of a judgment 
impliedly assents to all the consequences legitimately 
following such reversal or affirmance." 
The rule is stated thus in 22 Corpus Juris Secundum 275, 
p. 411, "Criminal Law": 
" * * * An accused person waives his right to plead 
former jeopardy by applying for a new trial. When, 
therefore, a new trial is granted in the appellate court, 
and he is reindicted, or is tried on the original indict-
ment, accused cannot plead, as a bar to the prosecution, 
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the conviction which was reversed on the appeal, even 
though he had not asked for a new trial." 
See also People vs. Stratton, 28 P2d. 695, 136 Cal App 201, 
and People vs. Eppinger, 41 Pac. 1037, 109 Cal 294. 
In view of the fact that there is no question but that 
defendant committed larceny of one degree or another, in 
event this Court finds error in the trial court's instruction No. 
8, then we submit that the case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The record amply supports the finding that the defendant 
stole the automobile in question. Nowhere in his appeal 
does defendant deny this or urge that the record does not 
support a finding of larceny. Merely to state that theft of a 
model 1947 Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition could 
be petit larceny appears ludicrous. We respectfully submit 
that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in taking 
judicial notice that such an automobile is worth more than 
$50.00. 
Further, we respectfully submit that, if the trial court 
thus committed prejudicial error, then defendant is at most 
entitled to a new trial, and if such trial be ordered, he cannot 
plead jeopardy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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